President Defeated and Tiger Shoots Par in UDRP Decisions

In some recent UDRP domain-name decisions involving personal names and common-law trademarks, world-renowned fame did not guarantee success in obtaining transfer of domain names associated with the names. Former President Clinton was defeated in a UDRP decision involving three domain names similar or identical with his name, while Tiger Woods went 1-1 in securing domain names matching his children's names.

Former President of the United States William J. Clinton and The William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation brought a UDRP complaint against Web of Deception regarding the domain name registrations for "williamclinton.com", "williamjclinton.com" and "presidentbillclinton.com". Each of these domain names provided direct links to the website for the Republican National Committee. Complainant asserted that he had established common-law trademark rights in his name and its variations. It was also alleged that the Respondent was known to have deliberately registered other domain names of politicians, such as President Obama and Senator John McCain, for various nefarious reasons. Respondent asserted that his registrations and use of the domain names constituted a fair use and were therefore not a use in bad faith. Respondent also claimed that he was working with others to promote the idea that some domain names, including the names of famous places and politicians, deserve protection under federal statutes.

In denying the UDRP claim, the Panelist analyzed the three necessary elements of a UDRP and determined that not all of the elements were supported by the evidence. In assessing whether the domain names were identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights, the Panelist followed the common view of the UDRP policy, in that a trademark registration is unnecessary where Complainant can prove common-law rights by establishing that its mark has acquired secondary meaning. After easily establishing secondary meaning in the WILLIAM CLINTON mark, it was determined that the disputed domain names were confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. The Panelist also determined that the Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain names, and that Respondent had no rights or legitimate interest in the domain names. The Panelist opined that the domain names resolving to a website related to the Republican Party were not considered a bona fide offering of goods and services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.

The decision turned on the last element of a UDRP, as the Panelist decided that Complainant had failed to meet the burden of proof regarding bad-faith registration and use under Policy ¶4(a)(iii). The Panelist noted that the only potentially available claim for bad faith that would apply related to preventing the mark holder from registering the domain, and this element requires a showing of a pattern of conduct. While the Respondent's conduct in registering the names of politicians was considered a pattern, the Panelist summarily determined that the Respondent had adequately rebutted any inference of bad faith. The Panelist further found that the fact the domain names linked to the Republican National Committee website, while possibly giving the impression of an affiliation with its political competitor, was not within the scope of the Policy. The UDRP request for transfer was therefore denied as to all three domain names.

In other recent personal name UDRP cases, Eldrick 'Tiger' Woods attempted to retrieve domain names that matched his minor children's names. While Tiger was able to "birdie" the recovery of the domain name "samalexiswoods.com" in a default UDRP proceeding where the Respondent consented to transfer, he "bogeyed" the UDRP proceeding to transfer the domain name "charlieaxelwoods.com" matching his newborn son's name, Charlie Axel Woods. In each case, Complainant attempted to claim common-law trademark rights based on rights in the TIGER WOODS marks, while also unsuccessfully asserting common-law trademark rights in his newborn children's names.

In the contested UDRP matter, the Respondent had registered the domain name the day after Charlie Axel Woods was born. The Panelist did not reach the issues of rights or legitimate interests, or bad faith registration and use, as the matter was decided based on lack of a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights. The key issue was whether the personal name "Charlie Axel Woods" is protectable as a common law trademark or service mark. The Panelist relied on a review of a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) report regarding the Internet Domain Name Process. The report notes that Panel decisions that elected to protect personal names occurred in cases where the law of the particular country recognized the registration of personal names as trademarks or services marks or where countries recognized the common law acquisition of trademarks or service marks through use and the acquisition of a secondary meaning as the source of goods or services.

There is also a split of opinion as to whether the UDRP should be broadened to protect non-commercial uses of personal names. In its advisory report, WIPO has noted that "persons who have gained eminence and respect, but who have not profited from their reputation in commerce, may not avail themselves of the UDRP to protect their personal names against parasitic registrations". Following prior UDRP decision, the Panelist in this case determined that, in a jurisdiction that recognized common law marks, the personal name must be used in connection with a commercial offering of goods and services or that the personal name in question has acquired secondary meaning as the source of such goods or services. Although Tiger Woods attempted to piggyback trademark or service mark rights in his own name, it was determined that his son must have his own rights, as the child's name was not confusingly similar to the TIGER WOODS marks. Since Charlie Axel Woods was a newborn, and no evidence was presented in support of his common law trademark rights, the request to transfer the domain name was denied with no need to consider the other elements of the UDRP policy.

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Understanding Social Networking

Social networking involves using online services (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Blogger, YouTube) to connect and interact with a community of people through online publishing and discussion.

Social networking allows companies and individuals to increase their online visibility, gain credibility, and build meaningful relationships with others.

Unlike a traditional company website that focuses on the particular company, social-networking websites are portals to a multitude of standardized user profiles belonging to various individuals and organizations. Membership in a social network (in addition to having a traditional website) offers brand owners certain advantages over using a traditional website alone; most notably, complimentary exposure and ability to interact with other network members. There are hundreds of social-networking sites and service providers. Some, like Facebook and Twitter, cater to the general public, while others, like IQONS and Model Mayhem are more niche-oriented (these two focus on fashion and modeling industries respectively).

Popular Social Networking Tools

Service	Description
Badoo	Social-networking website. Allows users to create profiles, upload content and grow their network by inviting or accepting invitations from other users. Offers various communication tools to encourage interaction between users.
Bebo
Facebook
Friendster
MySpace
Odnoklassniki
Orkut
V Kontakte
LinkedIn	Business-oriented social-networking website used for professional networking.
Xing
Meetup	Interest-based networking focused on meeting offline to participate in various activities
Ning	Interest-based networking tool that allows users to join or create networks based on specific interest. Brand owners may create a network around their brand.
Blogger	Blogging platform
Livejournal
WordPress
Meebo	Instant messaging tool that supports simultaneous connection to multiple IM services, allowing user to communicate with other users without having to use the same service.
Tumblr	Microblogging application
Twitter
Flickr	Social-networking website centered around photo sharing
YouTube	Video-sharing platform
Vimeo
FriendFeed	Aggregator service that consolidates updates from social networking websites, blogs, tweets, etc.

What Others Are Doing

General Electric Company

GE has been using a custom-build professional-networking tool called SupportCentral to connect vendors, customers and employees for many years.

GE blogs: http://www.grcblog.com/, http://www.gereports.com/.

GE uses Facebook to attract IT talent and has set up discussion forums for employees and general public. GE was one of the first companies to be granted a namesake URL: http://www.facebook.com/GE.

GE also has YouTube and Twitter profiles used to broadcast company news, http://www.youtube.com/user/GEreports; http://twitter.com/GE_reports.

Exxon Mobil

Exxon Mobil is a prime example of a company with zero involvement in social media and a case study that demonstrates that if you do not manage your online reputation, others will do it for you.

Exxon Mobil is not using Twitter, or any other social media forum to communicate about its corporate operations. Last year, when someone impersonated the brand on Twitter, the incident received a lot of media attention. The offending account was later suspended.

Another well-publicized hoax involving the brand was perpetrated by a Facebook user creating an event called Free Gallon of Gas Day, http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=12912038029&ref=nf.

Brand owners should be monitoring the discussion and mentions of their brands in social networks. Brand owners should also consider participating, because, as this case study shows, the power has shifted to those who participate.

Procter & Gamble

Procter & Gamble has challenged itself to understand and master social media tools, regarding social media as the future of marketing. To better understand the power of social media, the company has recently hosted Digital Hack Night, bringing together marketers and social media experts. People were split into four teams of about 40 people and each team had been given a unique newly-created URL to promote and generate t-shirt sales for charity through social networking. The exercise was to be accomplished in four hours.

In 60 minutes through networking, well targeted ads, SMS messaging, and viral videos we have generated 1200 hits for a site that didn't even exist before 5pm tonight.

This exercise illustrated the power of social networks to promote a brand and to generate sales by driving visitors to a traditional website that otherwise may not have attracted any customers.

Sample YouTube videos made in the course of the project can be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sU-3WrAx8XI&feature=channel_page and at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrm9pp7F3tk.

Procter & Gamble, like many others, has recently claimed a personalized URL for its Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/procterngamble.

Overview of Most Popular Services

Twitter (http://www.twitter.com)

Twitter is a micro-blogging service that lets users publish short (up to 140 characters) messages or "tweets" which appear on a user's page (https://twitter.com/USERNAME) and are transmitted to each of the user's subscribers or "followers." Users can restrict their readership to a circle of friends or allow open access to anyone. Users may send and receive tweets via the website or use browser- or smartphone-based applications for added convenience and extra features.

Twitter allows users to add keywords or "hashtags" to their tweets by prefixing a word or phrase with the # symbol. The @ symbol followed by a username is used to direct a tweet to the attention of that specific user. These features are exploited by various applications. For example, Twitterhawk (http://www.twitterhawk.com/) is a targeted-marketing application that sends automated customized responses based on specified keywords and user's location; TweetBeep (http://tweetbeep.com/) keeps track of conversations that mention you, your products, your company, your website or blog, or anything else you want to monitor, and provides hourly reports. There are applications for pre-scheduling tweets to post at a certain time or periodically at a given interval; for managing your followers, for posting updates to other networking sites, for aggregating and organizing your friends' feeds, etc.

Brand owners may use Twitter to communicate with their tech-savvy followers, to build a community of brand supporters, create awareness, draw traffic to company website, gauge customer satisfaction level, get customer feedback and re-tweet praise from customers to potential customers; as well as keep track of competitors and police brand abuse.

Similarly to URLs, having the company name or housemark as the username is desirable for the company. The goodwill associated with the CANON mark, for example, has attracted 1,363 followers (as of this writing) to http://twitter.com/canon, a significant number considering that this user has posted zero updates and is not following anyone else.

Defensively registering every possible combination of company name and trademarks is not practical, in our view, because such "ghost" usernames may detract from the company's official account, diluting a brand's Twitter presence.

Twitter prohibits impersonation and name squatting and is known to honor companies' requests to protect their brands.

Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/)

Facebook is a social-networking website that allows users to create profiles and join networks organized by geographical region, city, school and workplace. Users can share information about themselves, add other users as friends, and communicate with other users in a variety of ways including posting status updates, sending private messages, writing on user's virtual wall, instant messaging, "poking," sending virtual gifts, "tagging," and sending event invitations.

Companies and organizations may set up a company page to provide information about the company, publicize company news and upcoming events, share photos and videos, host discussion boards, and recruit talent. Individual users may then choose to become "fans" of your company, and generate interest in your company among their friends.

Companies and individual users may also create groups—clubs organized around a particular idea or topic. For example, Motorola's fan group bills itself as "The latest and the greatest, of one of the most stylish brands in the telecommunication business!" and, as of this writing, has some 2,844 members.

On June 13, 2009, Facebook has introduced a customized URL feature, allowing users to claim http://www.facebook.com/USERNAME as a link to their profile. Although on a very short notice, brand owners had been encouraged to register their marks to prevent abuse.

Blogger (https://www.blogger.com/)

Blogger is a popular blog publishing platform. Blogs that do not publish to their own websites are hosted by Google as subdomains of blogspot.com, e.g. http://USERNAME.blogspot.com/

Maintaining a blog increases one's online visibility and is a good way to showcase one's expertise and leadership in a particular field or industry.

We do not believe that defensive registrations of company names, marks, or officers' names as usernames are practical and do not recommend creating them. We recommend hosting company blogs on the company's official website(s).

YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/)

YouTube is a video sharing service. Users may upload videos to their profile or "channel" to share; search for other videos; view, rate and leave comments; subscribe to the channels that interest them; tag favorite videos for further reference and embed video files into other sites.

Google markets YouTube to brand owners as "the world's largest focus group."

A brand channel with a strong following can provide tremendous insights into the consumers who interact with your content and your brand.

Google's recent integration of Google Analytics, its web-traffic tracking tool, with YouTube brand channels has the potential of giving brand owners a much richer and deeper understanding of their brand channel's performance, enabling them to track such metrics as how long visitors stay, repeat visits, bounce rate, and page views per visitor. Brand owners wishing to tailor their videos to a specific audience would benefit from knowing where channel viewers are located geographically and what languages they speak—information that Google Analytics provides.

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Lost in [Literal] Translation: Application of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents in In re Helen Trimarch and Michael Merr

In a split decision on May 14th, 2009, the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) reversed a finding of likelihood of confusion based upon misapplication of the doctrine of foreign equivalents. In In re Helen Trimarch and Michael Merr, the TTAB concluded that the application for ALLEZ FILLES! & Design for certain clothing items would not cause confusion with the registration for GO GIRL, on identical clothing items, despite the literal translation of "allez filles" to "go girls."

The Examining Attorney originally refused registration of ALLEZ FILLES! & Design, in the name of Helen Trimarch and Michael Merr, based upon a 2(d) likelihood of confusion with Registration No. 2227005 for GO GIRL. Both marks cover clothing items in class 25. The Examining Attorney determined that "Allez Filles" was equivalent to "go girl" based upon an online translation, Applicant's submitted translation of the mark, and a message from the USPTO's translator stating that "Allez Filles" translates to "go girls."

Upon appeal, Applicant argued that "allez filles" is, technically, grammatically incorrect French, thus French-speaking consumers would not bother to directly translate the phrase. Applicant contended that, at most, French-speaking consumers may recognize the phrase, "allez filles," to mean "let's go girls," or "allez les filles." This interpretation differed from the phrase "go girl" which, Applicant argued, had a more "urban" connotation in the English language than the invitational "let's go girls."

Two of the three TTAB judges agreed that the doctrine of foreign equivalents would not apply, as French-speaking consumers would most likely ignore the phrase given its grammatical incorrectness. Moreover, while "allez" translates, literally, to "go" and "filles" to "girls," it does not necessarily hold that "allez filles" is equivalent to the meaning of English phrase "go girls," as online translations often do not consider phrasal meanings of words in combination. As the phrases were not, in the Board's opinion, equivalent, the doctrine of foreign equivalency would not apply. The Board reversed the refusal based upon the lack of foreign equivalency which added to the overall differences in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression between "ALLEZ FILLES! & Design" and "Go Girl."

In his dissent, Judge Drost argued that the doctrine of foreign equivalents would apply in this situation, as "Allez Filles" was "the type of term that prospective purchasers would stop and translate." While "the line between foreign words that consumers would stop and translate is not always clear" Judge Drost argued that the TTAB should assume every individual with a familiarity of the foreign language would translate a foreign term. Moreover, in the present situation, the TTAB's decision allowed two marks covering identical goods to exist on the register, one reading "GO GIRL" and the other having a literal translation to "GO GIRLS," whether or not the literal translation was actually "equivalent." According to Judge Drost the refusal should have been maintained, as the meaning of the marks was similar enough to cause potential confusion in the marketplace.

In re Helen Trimarch and Michael Merr ultimately turned upon whether French-speaking consumers would or would not stop to translate the term "allez filles" and whether literal and equivalent translations are one in the same. This case illustrates the enduring difficulty in applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents, especially in cases where an equivalency would mean the difference between refusal and allowance. The Board's split opinion seems to call for greater clarification in the standards which determine the doctrine of foreign equivalents' application in a given situation. Such clarification may be difficult to accomplish, especially given the already subjective nature of the standard and its requirement to predict the mental decisions of everyday consumers.

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Google Expands Use of Trademarks in its AdWords Despite Adverse Court Rulings finding "Use in Commerce" and New Class Action Suits

Google has announced that it will be amending its AdWords Trademark Policy in June. In a move that will likely not please trademark owners, Google will be changing its AdWords Trademark Policy on how it follows up on complaints regarding trademark use in keywords. Google will also allow trademark terms in ad text in the U.S. These changes come on the heels of recent adverse legal rulings and lawsuit filings against Google regarding its sale of trademarks as keywords in advertising.

Beginning June 4, 2009, Google will no longer restrict trademark use in keywords in an additional 190 countries, conforming to its current policy for the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and Ireland. Keywords that were previously restricted as a result of a trademark investigation will begin triggering ads in the affected regions. While the expansion of this policy covers a significant number of countries, it will still not apply to most of the European Community nor to Australia, New Zealand, or China. With the changes, Google will no longer investigate complaints relating to the use of trademarks as keywords by AdWords advertisers. The result will be that users in these additional countries will see ads in the sponsored links section containing advertising triggered by the trademarks purchased as keywords. A company may purchase a competitor's trademark as a keyword, and a user searching for that keyword will see a greater number of ads, including those of the trademark holder's competitor. Google will continue to perform investigations related to ad text, but will no longer restrict keywords based on a trademark complaint and investigation.

Google also will be making changes to its AdWords policy in the United States, with the effects beginning on June 15, 2009. These changes will only affect ads targeting the U.S. If an ad doesn't comply with Google's trademark policy in other countries, the ad may not be eligible to appear in those other countries. The significant change in policy is that Google will now allow, under certain criteria, the use of trademarks in ad's text, even if the advertiser does not own that trademark and has no explicit approval from the trademark owner to use it. These changes only pertain to sponsored advertising and will not impact natural search results. Ad texts containing trademarks will be allowed if the website: facilitates the sale of goods or services, or sells components, replacement parts or compatible products corresponding to the trademark; contains information about the goods or services corresponding to the trademark; or, when the term is used in a descriptive or generic way and not in reference to the trademark owner. The policy will not pertain to ads containing competitive or critical information about the goods and services corresponding to a trademark.

Allowing additional trademark use in AdWords and text would appear to fly in the face of recent court rulings and lawsuits involving Google. In Google's AdWords program, advertisers bid on and purchase keywords, which may include trademarks of third parties. When an internet user enters a search term using Google's search engine, the resulting hits include regular or "natural" search results based on relevance, along with "Sponsored Links" results triggered by the particular keywords in the search query. These "Sponsored Links" are paid, contextual advertising that is auctioned for sale through Google's AdWords, with the highest bidder usually having its Sponsored Link listed first.

In the recently anticipated decision in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir.2009), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that Google's sale of trademarks in its AdWords program was considered a "use in commerce" which could subject Google to trademark infringement liability. In that case, Google had sold the RESCUECOM trademark to third parties, including Rescuecom's competitors, through its AdWords program and "Keyword Suggestion Tool". The Court found that Google had recommended, encouraged and sold the Plaintiff's trademark, and therefore made use of the mark. The Court determined that this use was more than just internal use, and was, in fact a use in commerce. However, the Court remanded the matter back to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether Google's use of Rescuecom's trademark caused a likelihood of confusion or mistake, or dilution. The pending outcome leaves trademark owners, keyword purchasers and keyword sellers in the dark as to trademark infringement liability regarding use of the trademarks as keywords. In the meantime, trademark owners are also concerned about possibly having to pay more money to Google so that their ads appear ahead of competitors' ads.

The issue of use of a third-party trademark in Google AdWords advertising has also been hotly debated and contested in the European Community. Preliminary rulings regarding whether Google's AdWords advertising constitutes relevant use of a trademark sufficient for infringement have been inconclusive. These preliminary rulings from the Austrian Supreme Court and the highest French civil court have been sent to the European Court of Justice for determination of whether the use of a third-party trademark as a keyword is infringing. Similarly, three decisions from the German Federal Supreme Court have reached differing results based on differing facts. The German Federal Supreme Court has also sought referral to the European Court of Justice for further determination. These decisions are not expected until the summer of 2010, thereby leaving uncertainty regarding liability for use of trademarks as keywords in Europe.

In a further outcry of some trademark owners disturbed by Google's AdWords policies, two class action lawsuits were recently filed against Google in Federal Court in Texas. While both were filed by the same law firm, the suits are for the protection of two different classes. In the initial lawsuit filed, FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Plaintiff, Firepond, alleges that Google's AdWords policy infringes the trademarks of all Texas trademark owners. The second lawsuit, brought by ‘John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC', is on behalf of all U.S. trademark holders. Whether the Federal Court determines that the trademark issues and parties can sufficiently be joined to be certified as a class action remains to be seen. If a class is certified in these cases, of greater concern to trademark holders may be whether Google decides to settle the cases thereby binding all trademark owners who have not opted out of the class, and eliminating their right to sue.

What is clear from the above matters involving Google's AdWords policy is that uncertainty still exists in the United States and around the world in viewing trademark infringement liability for use of a third-party trademark in one's keyword advertising on Google's websites. It would be prudent for trademark owners and advertisers to keep a close eye on future decisions and developments involving Google's AdWords trademark policies and keyword sales.

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Supreme Court to Review Business Method Patent Bilski Decision

In an order that is sure to have major repercussions for the future of patent law, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, agreeing to take up for appeal the case of Bilski v. Doll. The order granting the appeal is a discretionary act of the Supreme Court, and is an acknowledgment that patent law principles of the permissible scope of patentable subject matter are in need of further clarification.

Focusing specifically on business method patents, the en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), Chief Judge Michel writing for nine of the twelve members of the CAFC opined on the issue of patentable subject matter as widely applied in test from a previous decision, State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group. The CAFC opinion did not explicitly overrule the State Street decision, but declared State Street's "useful, concrete and tangible" test as being irrelevant to determine whether the claimed method constitutes a statutory "process" under § 101 so as to be the patent eligible subject matter under the Patent Laws.

The basis of the Bilski opinion is grounded in the intent of the Congress in defining what is patentable subject matter. Generally, neither laws of nature, natural phenomena, nor abstract ideas are patentable. The CAFC concluded the claims of Bilski were unpatentable because they failed the new test which was established by the Court. The court held that any process that does not transform physical matter or require performance by machine is not within the definition of "process." "Process" is defined in the 1952 patent statute (35 U.S.C. §100(b)) as "a process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." In contradistinction, a precedential decision of the Supreme Court found a life form to be patentable, and opined that "everything under the sun made by man" should be considered patentable.

While in Bilski the CAFC reaffirmed generally that both business methods and software are patent eligible subject matter, the decision also reiterated that a more appropriate test is the "machine or transformation" test as set forth above. The patent community had interpreted that test to require a method or software either be associated with a machine or device or alternatively that the method transform a particular article into a different state or thing.

In Bilski, the court affirmed the Examiner's rejection of Bilski's method claims, by affirming the ruling of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The claims were drawn to a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading. The CAFC found that the Bilski claims failed to provide the necessary transformation a particular article into a different state or thing. Now the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that its guidance is necessary for further clarification of what subject matter is patentable under the patent laws enacted by the Congress. It is generally assumed that the U.S. Supreme Court would not have granted certiorari unless it intends to overturn the CAFC decision. However, further clarification of the eligible subject matter will be a welcome result, whatever the outcome. Numerous business method patents have been issued by the USPTO and their validity is in question following the CAFC Bilski decision. As an added variable, timely consent by the Senate to the appointment to the Supreme Court of Judge Sotomayor will allow the case to be heard by a full complement of nine justices, and should also provide some insight into her philosophy regarding patents, something that her prior experience as a prosecutor and judge has not yet revealed.

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Monsanto and DuPont Entangled in Another Patent Infringement Dispute

Monsanto and DuPont have a long history of patent-related disputes and licensing agreements to maintain the status quo as cooperative rivals in the highly competitive field of genetically engineered agricultural seeds. Their current dispute has resulted in lawsuit filed by Monsanto in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging patent infringement, breach of contract and unjust enrichment by DuPont and its subsidiary, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., through Pioneer's allegedly unlawful use of Monsanto's proprietary Roundup Ready herbicide-tolerant technology in soybean and corn seeds.

Monsanto's Roundup Ready seeds have been genetically engineered to enable soybean and corn plants to tolerate exposure to glyphosate weed killers and herbicides, namely, Monsanto's Roundup. In 2002 DuPont licensed Monsanto's Roundup Ready seed technology, but has been developing its own glyphosate resistant seed technology, named Optimum GAT, to offer an alternative to Monsanto's Roundup. Through field testing DuPont had determined that Optimum GAT seeds did not perform as desired. DuPont did determine that combining or "stacking" the Roundup Ready technology with the Optimum GAT technology resulted in a "plow-worthy" seed.

The trigger for this lawsuit is a provision in the 2002 license agreement that is aimed at preventing the combining or "stacking" of non-Roundup Ready technologies with Roundup Ready seeds. Monsanto aims to enforce the anti-stacking provision of the license agreement. DuPont claims the anti-stacking clause was nullified by the U.S. Justice Department in 2008 when the DOJ ordered Monsanto to abandon similar restrictions on cottonseed breeders.

The parties have exchanged unpleasantries in the media. Monsanto CEO has stated that "… unlawfully taking technology is neither imitation nor flattery; it is unethical and wrong. A true technology company respects patents and its contractual agreements and delivers new products through its own innovation and honest collaboration." A DuPont VP fired back, stating that "Monsanto has a long history of using litigation and aggressive tactics to preserve their monopoly and attempt to intimidate customers, seed partners, and competitors."

While this litigation is in its infancy and no clear path to resolution has been established, another license agreement or amendments to the 2002 agreement may ultimately be negotiated to return Monsanto and DuPont to their status quo ante.

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ICANN's Implementation Recommendation Team Proposes Crearinghouse to Safeguard Well-known Marks

As we previously reported, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) released a revised Draft Applicant Guidebook relating to its plans for the expansion of gTLDs (generic top-level domains). To identify and resolve potential issues for trademark holders in the implementation of new gTLDs, ICANN formed the Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT) comprised of representatives from a variety of constituencies, including private practitioners, in-house attorneys for brand owners, registry and registrar representatives, and other domain name and trademark experts from around the world. While there has been criticism of the IRT, including lack of transparency, the group has provided to ICANN its recommendations and proposed several solutions to combat trademark infringement in the implementation of new gTLDs. The draft report was released on April 24, 2009, and although the time period for comment closes on May 24, 2009, IRT has indicated that it will only consider comments submitted by May 6, 2009 before issuing its final report. There has been additional criticism regarding the short time period for comment regarding an issue of great impact to trademark owners, with some members of the community requesting additional time. The full contents of the Trademark Protection Draft Report can be viewed at http://www.icann.com/en/announcements/announcement-24apr09-en.htm.

In preparation for and during the IRT's meetings, the group considered and reviewed numerous proposals that had been set forth in comments to the initial Draft Applicant Guidebook. The categories of reviewed comments included: comments on the guidebook; pre-launch mechanisms; post-delegation at the top level domains; post-delegation at the second level domains; and dispute policies.

The IRT's draft recommendations include the following: creation of an IP Clearinghouse, Globally Protected Marks List and associated rights protection mechanisms, and standardized pre-launch rights protection mechanisms; creation of a Uniform Rapid Suspension System ("URS"); post delegation dispute resolution mechanisms at the top level; WHOIS requirements for new TLDs; and use of algorithm in string confusion review during initial evaluation.

With the creation of an IP Clearinghouse, a representative of a rights owner would pay a fee and submit data to the IP Clearinghouse. This data would be validated initially and every year thereafter to ensure accuracy. The validated data would then be available in the IP Clearinghouse for new gTLD registry operators or pulled by registries or registrars for use in applications such as a Watch Service to notify rights owners of applications for a term corresponding to their mark or in an IP Claims Services that would notify applicants and trademark owners that a current validated right exists on a term being applied for.

The Clearinghouse could also be utilized in a Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) that would be a quicker and less expensive alternative to a UDRP proceeding for domain names that infringe IP rights or that support malicious behaviors. The URS would only be used for those cases in which there is no genuine question as to the infringement and abuse that is taking place. While more cost effective and swifter than a UDRP, the procedure would only result in the taking down of content and locking of infringing domain name registrations for the life of the registration, but would not result in the transfer or cancellation of a domain name registration.

In addition, it is proposed that a Globally Protected Marks List be created to assist in blocking applications for such terms at the top and second levels. The intention of this list is to include only marks that are globally protected and well-known, with high standards for inclusion and enforcement.

Submitting data stored in the IP Clearinghouse to registries during Pre-Launch periods may also provide a cost savings to trademark owners who might otherwise need to submit the same data several times for verification at multiple registries, while ensuring consistency of validation.

The IRT has also proposed maintaining WHOIS information for domain names under a "Thick WHOIS" model, which is controversial with privacy rights advocates. This "Thick WHOIS" model would create a central, registry-level provision of WHOIS information for all domain names registered within the registry, rather than the current model whereby each registrar may maintain their own database, with varying degrees of disclosure of information. The IRT also recommended that ICANN begin to explore the establishment of a central, universal WHOIS database to be maintained by ICANN.

Although the IRT was ambitious in its undertaking and proposed recommendations, the committee has itself noted that it does not have the final solutions or details for its proposals in protecting valuable trademark rights. The IRC has requested additional comments and proposals from the domain name community before submitting its final report for consideration by the ICANN community at its meeting in Sydney in June 2009.

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Google Book Search or Seizure — Antitrust Concerns

Months after finally reaching a settlement with individual authors, the Association of American Publishers, and the Authors Guild over copyright issues, Google Book Search is again faced with another potential setback, this time from the Department of Justice. The Department launched an inquiry this month to examine potential antitrust implications of the proposed settlement, stemming from provisions many argue give the company favorable treatment and could inhibit competition in the digital book industry. The issues are both new and old, as the antitrust concerns stem in part from controversial copyright provisions of the agreement, and are best explained by first discussing the project's challenges leading up to the proposed settlement.

Google Book Search

Google's initial Book Search, launched in 2004, consisted of a program which would scan and index books from libraries of major universities. The program allowed users to search the text of the books by entering queries into its book search engine. The search engine would then lists results showing "snippets" from each copyrighted book that fit the query, and, most often, the entirety of those in the public domain. The program, accessible to U.S. residents only, made no effort to ascertain the owners of the copyrights to the books, or to obtain permission from the copyright owners. Moreover, it provided no mechanism for copyright owners to exclude their books from the index.

Copyright Issues

In September 2005, The Authors Guild and three individual authors filed a class-action lawsuit against Google alleging that the company's book search amounted to massive copyright infringement. At first, Google responded by arguing that its program was protected by the fair use doctrine of copyright law. The fair use doctrine outlines certain circumstances under which copyrighted materials may be used without permission from the copyright owner based on the purpose of the intended use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount of the work used, and the effect the use would have on the market value for the work. Google argued that its use of the copyrighted books was permitted under the fair use doctrine because search results only showed users a brief "snippet" of text from the books where the search term appeared, rather than large chunks or the whole book, and because the program would encourage sales of the books. Opponents argued, however, that this argument overlooked the fact that Google was copying the text of the entire books into its system, stating that it was not so much concern over what is delivered to the user, but the fact that the program copies the entire works in the first place without permission from the copyright owner.

Settlement

In October 2008, after two years of negotiation, Google reached a Settlement, dubbed "the biggest book deal in U.S. publishing history" with the individual authors, the Association of American Publishers, and the Authors Guild, under which Google is to pay $125 million for the rights to display 20% of any copyrighted book covered by the agreement (not just a "snippet"). Although the parties never reached agreement as to the actual copyright infringement concerns at issue, it was mutually decided that finding a middle ground would benefit all concerned. By granting Google the rights to display chunks, rather than snippets, it was argued, hard-to-find books would be more accessible to the public.

Under the deal, Google is also permitted to sell access to individual texts and online subscriptions to individual users and institutions giving access to its entire collection of books. Thirty-seven percent of the profits gathered from the subscriptions, books sales, and advertising revenue are to be kept by Google, and the remaining sixty-three percent are to be collected by a non-profit entity created under the Settlement called the Book Rights Registry, and are to be contributed to a royalty system designed to compensate the authors and publishers involved for access to their works. The Book Rights Registry would also be responsible for making efforts to locate and register copyright owners so that they have a chance to agree or not agree to have their works included in the program. Remaining profits are to go towards settling claims by copyright owners and other legal fees.

Antitrust and Other Concerns

The Settlement has not been met lightly by others in the industry, however. Competitors and critics, including Internet Archive and Consumer Watchdog, are concerned that the Settlement essentially gives Google a monopoly over the digital book industry. In particular, there are concerns over the Settlement's "most favored nation" clause and "orphan works" provision.

A "most favored nation" clause is a contract clause in which a seller agrees to give the buyer the best terms it makes available to any other buyer. The inclusion of this clause in the Settlement means that the Book Rights Registry would be prevented from offering better terms to Google's competitors. While this may not sounds too bad on paper, critics worry that more advantageous terms will be necessary for smaller competitors such as Yahoo! or Microsoft to have a chance to enter the digital book market. Critics argue that the provision's restriction on the Registry's ability to do so, even if it believes it is necessary to enable fair competition, violates antitrust laws and should thus be removed.

Another concern stems from the Settlement's "orphan works" provision. Under the Settlement, authors and publishers are effectively opted into the agreement unless they expressly opt out of having their works included in the program. This is of special concern for those copyrighted works dubbed "orphan works". Orphan works are written materials still under copyright but for which the copyright owner cannot be found, and thus permission cannot be obtained. Millions of books fall into this category. Under normal circumstances, companies are discouraged from using these works for fear that the rights holder will eventually emerge and file suit for substantial copyright damages. Because this Settlement was negotiated as a result of a Class Action lawsuit, however, if passed, Google would not have this worry because it would not be required to seek consent from these authors. Once the class, including all copyright owners potentially affected, was certified by the Court, the representatives of the Class were given the ability to negotiate on behalf of the entire class, including authors of orphan works. Many fear the provision goes too far by essentially granting Google blanket and exclusive license to potentially millions of works. They argue that because the provision shields Google from liability for using these works, while providing no such protection to any other competitors, it is in essence a barrier for other competitors seeking to enter the market. If this rings true, Google would have free reign to raise prices for access to the collection. Thus, critics argue that the provision should instead be extended to cover all who digitize books.

Critics also argue that that Settlement goes too far from a societal-standards perspective. With Google as the sole decider which works would or would not be offered to the public, some fear it will essentially become a primary designator of what is appropriate or not for public viewing. Moreover, the actual authors of works covered by the Settlement could potentially be prohibited from offering their works elsewhere.

Conclusion

These developments have prompted the Judge overseeing the Settlement to postpone the deadline for authors to opt out of the Settlement by four months, per the request of many authors and heirs of authors desiring more time to review the deal. Although the Court must have found reason to certify the parties who brought the lawsuit as fair representatives of the entire Class, the Settlement is still subject to Court approval, providing another chance for the Court to consider whether the representatives have fairly negotiated on behalf of the orphan works authors.

In the meantime, Google appears to be moving ahead, albeit at a slower pace, with development of the online book search. Google has faced antitrust allegations in the past and it has always been willing to take a step back. While the D.O.J.'s inquiries show that it believes there is something to the concerns raised by critics, it does not necessarily mean it will oppose the Settlement, or that the Settlement will be approved in the first place.

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TTAB Rules Fender Guitar Shape Generic

Starting in the 1950s, Leo Fender and the Fender Music Instrument Corp. ("Fender") helped pioneer the sound of the modern electric guitar. From soulful blues to hard rock to reverb-laden surf, Fender guitars have made their mark. The names FENDER, STRATOCASTER and TELECASTER are arguably famous trademarks, known both to musicians and the general public. However, when Fender sought trademark protection for the design of its three main guitar body configurations, it hit a sour note.

In 2003, Fender filed applications to register three marks before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, each representing "a fancifully shaped configuration of the body portion of a guitar." The applications were opposed by a group of no less than seventeen guitar manufacturers and retailers. Opposers claimed Fender's product designs were not registrable since they were generic for guitar bodies and Fender did not have the requisite acquired distinctiveness in the designs to support registration.

Under U.S. precedent, product configurations are not inherently distinctive and may only be registered as trademarks upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness. To demonstrate that a product configuration, like a guitar body, has acquired distinctiveness, one must show that the primary significance of the configuration in the minds of consumers is not the product itself, but the source of that product. The issue is decided on the totality of the evidence, wherein such factors as length of use, exclusivity of use, consumer testimonials, sales and advertising data are relevant to the determination.

Additionally, the Lanham Act precludes registration of generic marks. A mark, whether a word or product design, can become generic if it ceases or fails to serve as a source identifier.

Opposers contended that Fender's alleged marks, the guitar body shapes, had become generic due to industry-wide copying of the designs. Opposers submitted extensive evidence from over one dozen manufacturers demonstrating that the Fender guitar shapes had been copied essentially since the products were first launched. Evidence also indicated that Fender never policed or sought to enforce any alleged trademark in the body designs over the years. Specifically, though Fender often challenged use of word marks or logo designs, it never challenged use of a guitar body shape, even though competitor bodies were virtually indistinguishable from Fender's. Fender's own advertising over the years also demonstrated the shapes were generic. A number of ads explicitly referenced competitor guitars and implored consumers not to be "fooled by imitations" and to seek out "the original." Lastly, though Fender first started marketing guitars in the shapes at issue in the 1950s and by its own admission became aware of widespread copying in the 1970s and beyond, it never claimed a trademark in the shapes until 2003 and 2004.

Opposers also argued the configurations were not registrable since they had not acquired distinctiveness. Here, too, the Board found that Fender failed. One consideration in the measure of acquired distinctiveness is length of and exclusivity of use of an alleged mark. Given industry-wide copying of Fender's body designs for the better part of fifty years, there was no such exclusivity of use. Further, Fender's failures to police its claimed mark over the years and to claim rights in same eroded any distinctiveness that Fender may have achieved. Thus, the applications were refused registration.

Based on this record, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that the product designs had become generic for the goods. The product designs failed to identify Fender as the source of the guitars at issue because over the years consumers have been exposed to a multitude of similar-appearing products in the market. Thus, the shape identified the product generally, and not the source of same. Therefore, registration was refused.

The Fender case demonstrates that when a company believes that a product configuration serves as a source identifier for its goods, the company should consider seeking trademark protection, claiming and enforcing rights from the beginning. Failure to take these steps early can lead to disastrous consequences down the line for potentially iconic designs. Though the burdens can be high and significant effort may be required to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness, the failure to seek protection may result in allowing a unique design to become generic, and the marketing value associated with a product design acting as a source identifier cannot be underestimated.

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OHIM Deflation

The Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) has announced that beginning May 1, 2009, official fee for obtaining a Community trademark registration will be reduced to € 900. This is a 40% reduction from the current € 1600 total fee made up of € 750 filing fee and € 850 registration fee for a mark in three classes. Effective May 1, 2009, applicants would pay a single € 900 official fee at the time of filing. Pending CTM applications for which OHIM has not issued the request for payment of the registration fee by May 1, 2009, will be exempt from current registration fee.
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The Importance of Registration—a Copyright Saga in Three Parts

On March 2, 2009, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Reed Elsevier Inc., et al. v. Muchnick, et al., No. 08-103, to answer whether 17 USC §411(a)—the requirement of registering a copyright before suing for its infringement—restricts subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over copyright infringement claims. The class-action case is an offspring of the decision in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, which held that the first publisher of a literary work written by a freelance writer does not, absent an explicit agreement, obtain rights to license the work for use in electronic databases, such as LexisNexis. The Court's answer could have a profound effect on the actual impact of the Tasini ruling.

In Tasini, six authors wrote articles for the New York Times, Newsday, and Time, which had engaged the authors as independent contractors. The publishers thereafter licensed the copy to LexisNexis and two other companies who made the articles available on CD-ROM without obtaining separate permissions from the authors. When the authors sued the print publishers for copyright infringement, publishers argued that no permission was needed because of §201(c) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of copyright in a collective work to reproduce and distribute authors' contributions as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series. The District Court sided with the print publishers, finding the articles' later inclusion in the electronic databases to be a reproduction "as part of a revision of that collective work" because the databases preserved the print publishers' "selection of articles" by copying all of the articles originally assembled in the periodical's daily or weekly issues. When the case reached the Supreme Court in 2001, however, it was ultimately decided in favor of the freelance authors. The Supreme Court concluded that §201(c) did not assist the print publishers because "the Databases reproduce[d] and distribute[d] [the] articles standing alone" and not "as part of that particular collective work" to which the author contributed; "as part of... any revision" thereof; or "as part of... any later collective work in the same series."

After Tasini was decided, several of the affected authors along with the National Writers Union and American Society of Journalists and Authors filed a consolidated class action suit against a group of forty publishers, including Reed Elsevier Inc. (owner of LexisNexis), The Gale Group Inc., and West Publishing Corporation to recover compensation for the freelance authors. After four years of negotiation the parties reached an industry-wide settlement, and sought its approval in the federal court of the Southern District of New York, filed under In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, MDL No. 1379. The complex settlement divides the claimants into 3 groups: A) those who had obtained copyright registration for their works prior to the alleged infringement; B) those who had obtained copyright registration for their works before December 31, 2002, but after the alleged infringement; and C) those whose works were not registered with the Copyright Office. The settlement was later approved by the District Court.

Present case was filed by Irvin Muchnik, an official of the National Writers Union and affected author, who organized a slate of similarly-situated objectors and appealed the District Court's approval of the settlement on the grounds that it provides grossly-inadequate compensation and is unfair to Class C authors who comprise over 99% of the claimants. The objectors took issue with the schedule for paying out the $18 million (max) settlement.

In the settlement, Class A members were eligible for statutory damages because their works had been registered with the Copyright Office at the time of the infringement. Compensation for members of Classes B and C, on the other hand, was to be dependent on the original sale price of the work. These claimants would receive either a flat fee or a percentage of the original sale price, whichever was greater; the flat fee and percentage set for Class C was much lower than that for Class B. In addition, under the settlement, should the total amount of the claims exceed $11.8 million (the cap amount permitted for awards after deducting attorneys' fees and administrative costs), the C Class award would be reduced first, all the way to zero if necessary, before either Class B or Class A awards are affected. If this were to happen, the objectors argued, it would be equivalent to Class C members granting the publishers an irrevocable, worldwide and continuing license to reproduce, license, and sell their works without any compensation. The objectors argued that allowing the named plaintiffs to grant such a right on behalf of all claimants included in Class C was a denial of due process.

The proponents of the settlement defended that the settlement was fair because members of Class C had no copyright registrations for their works, and thus, pursuant to §411(a), no standing to initiate an infringement action. Section §411(a) reads in relevant part: "...no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title..."

The Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement based largely on this very provision, ruling that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over Class C claims. The Court concluded that §411(a) is a jurisdictional requirement limiting district court's subject matter jurisdiction to claims arising out of registered copyrights only, and that the phrase "the copyright claim" in §411(a) should be interpreted to mean all of the claims in the Class, and not just the claims of the named Plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeals further found that the District Court lacked supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a), which reads: "Except as... expressly provided otherwise by federal statute, in any civil case of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, [they] shall also have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related... that they form part of the same case or controversy." Here, the Court focused on the phrase "except as... expressly provided otherwise by federal statute", reasoning that because §411(a) of the Copyright Act requires copyright registration for initiating an infringement suit, §1367(a) cannot confer supplemental jurisdiction over the claims involving unregistered copyrights simply because they are asserted together with other, jurisdictionally-proper claims. In other words, the Court found §411(a) to expressly provide otherwise. Thus, the Court of Appeals held, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to certify Class C and approve the settlement.

Of note is a dissent by Judge John Walker who argued that "Congress passed §411(a) to facilitate enforcement of copyrights", and that "... compliance with §411(a) is a mandatory prerequisite to the accrual of a cause of action for damages, but not a prerequisite to the possession of constitutional standing."

In response to the 2nd Circuit decision, a group of publishing companies asked the Supreme Court to review the case, arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with the high court's ruling in Tasini and leaves a vast majority of the affected authors without redress. The publishers also argue that §411(a) is not a source for jurisdictional limitation, noting that copyright registration is not a precondition for copyright protection.

The Supreme Court, on March 2, 2009, granted the writ of certiorari on the following question only, "Does 17 U.S.C. §411(a) restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions?" The case is expected to be argued in the fall of 2009, and will present the unusual situation where both sides of the original dispute are arguing to the same end—reinstatement of the settlement. The publishers who petitioned for a writ of certiorari would like to see the settlement reinstated so as to avoid the risk of more claimants coming forward, and having to continue to search and remove millions of articles from their databases. For the objectors, a reinstatement would not only mean that Class C claimants will have a chance to collect, but also that they would be able to appeal the approval of the settlement on its merits and argue for greater compensation.

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See a Trademark. Hear a Trademark... Smell a Trademark? The Singapore Treaty

In this age of competitive advertising, companies continually experiment with new media to impress product recognition on the human mind. In the past, marketers have appealed to our eyes with swoops, golden arches, and fonts. Today, the new frontier of advertising and product recognition will appeal to other senses—sound, taste, and even smell—to trigger consumer recognition, consider the Southwest Airlines "Ding," a grass-scented tennis ball, or an artificial strawberry flavor prevalently used by one pharmaceutical company. As these innovations grow, will formal protection for these source indicators, these non-traditional trademarks, follow suit? Currently, formal protection for non-traditional trademarks is sporadic and random, though the overall attention factor for this area is not. On March 16th, 2009, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) announced the implementation of the Singapore Treaty, the first International Treaty to specifically address the identity and registrability of non-traditional marks, including, but not limited to sound-, hologram-, motion-, color-, and taste marks.

The Singapore Treaty was adopted in March 2006 by a diplomatic conference of 147 WIPO member states to replace the 1994 Trademark Law Treaty (TLT). In its own implementation in 1994, the TLT sought to harmonize and simplify trademark registration procedures in countries party to the TLT, however, not only did the pre-internet TLT fail to cover all forms of electronic communication (as faxing was still considered "advanced" by 1994 standards), but also failed to consider non-visible marks as potential source indicators.

The Singapore Treaty recognizes that not all trademarks are two-dimensional visible product labels, and attempts to remedy the TLT's silence on the issue by specifically identifying new types of registrable marks such as hologram-, motion-, color-, sound-, and taste marks. Though the Singapore Treaty essentially legitimizes registration for these marks, the Treaty neither provides standardized procedures on how, exactly, one would represent these marks in applications, nor does the Treaty oblige contracting parties to register non-traditional marks. But because the Singapore Treaty has now publicly identified non-traditional marks as registrable, the assembly of the contracting parties will soon be able to define the relevant standards for treatment of non-traditional marks, in an effort to bring these marks into the trademark mainstream.

Though the possibility for non-traditional mark registration is generating buzz throughout the world, the presence of non-traditional registrations in various trademark offices is quite sparse. For example, though the Madrid system boasts more than 450,000 marks on the international registry, only 29 are audio marks. Currently, the Office of Harmonization has only 73 sound marks and one olfactory mark registered. In addition, the United States Trademark Trial and Appeals Board rejected registration for an artificial orange flavor additive in medications in 2006, noting the difficulty in defining how taste can function as a trademark when, generally, consumers only taste goods after purchase (In re N.V. Oregon, TTAB 2006).

Despite the apparent wariness of trademark registries to embrace non-traditional mark registration, the public outcry for acceptance has been recognized and addressed by international trademark publications and authorities. The International Trademark Association (INTA), for example, has filed amicus briefs with the European Court of Justice as well as the United States Supreme Court on three occasions in support of non-traditional mark registration. In addition, the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications (SCT) has defined a number of areas of convergence where non-traditional marks have already been addressed by WIPO member states to advance the groundwork for non-traditional mark registration as quickly as possible.

Thus, while non-traditional marks continue to grace the public stage, the translation from commerce to trademark registry has yet to be formally established. While the possibilities continue to grow, it may be several years before various flavors of a pet chew toy or an athlete's signature fist pump are as prevalent in registration as fanciful logos and creative taglines.

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Kindle Speaks, But Does It Infringe?

The Authors Guild, representing the interests of authors in the United States, has publicly alleged that Amazon's recently-released e-book reader, Kindle 2, violates an author's right to control creation of derivative works. Kindle 2 has a text-to-speech feature that enables the device to read aloud. Certainly, text-to-speech programs are nothing new to authors, as they are often used by the blind. Why then did the Authors Guild object to Kindle 2 that employs a similar technology?

The concern is that the reading feature will supplant audio book purchases, as an audio book generally costs more than a digital e-book. In the Guild's view, the feature allows e-book purchasers to have the equivalent of both a hard copy and an audio book in one digital file. The Guild's objection appears to be that the text-to-speech function, when utilized, creates a derivative work from the digital version of the written work in violation of the author's bundle of rights.

Whether a derivative work is created depends on whether or not Kindle's text-to-speech function actually creates a work fixed in a tangible medium that can be governed by copyright laws. If it does not, the Authors Guild's argument may not hold water, because the function would be equivalent to another person reading the text aloud (though not as a public performance).

In considering the issue of fixation the case law surrounding copying can be applied. In a recent case, Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2008), the court held that when just over one second of an audiovisual work, a "buffer," is held on a device such as a remote-storage DVR, the copy is only transitory and does not violate copyright holder's rights. It is important to note that Cartoon Network narrowly construed, but was not decided contrary to, the existing doctrine and precedent in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). In both cases the courts considered what constituted unlawful copying and whether there was sufficient fixation to bring a copy within the purview of copyright law. The same consideration would be needed if the Kindle controversy were litigated—is text-to-speech "copy" sufficiently fixed or is it merely transitory?

In MAI, the court considered whether loading a program into RAM makes a copy of the software that can be restricted by copyright. The Ninth Circuit decided that since such copy could be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated," the loading of software into RAM created a copy that infringed plaintiff's copyright in the software (In 1998, §117 of the Copyright Act was amended to create an exception allowing copies at issue in the case). In distinguishing this decision in Cartoon Network, Second Circuit reasoned that there were two requirements to find the fixation mandated by the statute, not just the single issue of embodiment considered by the Ninth Circuit in MAI.

To be "fixed," as defined in the statute, the work must be embodied in a way that is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated [the embodiment requirement] for a period of more than transitory duration [the duration requirement]" (17 U.S.C §101).

Hence, Second Circuit's recent ruling in Cartoon Network is not inconsistent with the decision in MAI, rather it narrowly construes the prior ruling and distinguishes the facts at issue. The court states that it did not interpret MAI decision to stand for the proposition that "as a matter of law, loading a program into RAM always results in copying." In fact, the Second Circuit notes that the court in MAI did not consider the duration requirement because it had already been established that the copy at issue was embodied in RAM for "at least several minutes" leaving the question of duration not in dispute (536 F.3d at 128). Because in Cartoon Network the transitory nature was in dispute, the court could not be rely on the prior decision in MAI in its entirety.

The decision in Cartoon Network provides some guidance as to what is not long enough to create a new work or an unlawful copy of an existing work, but it does not set a standard for duration that would make a copy more than a transitory fixation. Such question remains open, and if Kindle's text-to-speech function were considered by a court, it would lend further interpretation to MAI and Cartoon Network decisions with regard to duration and fixation. However, if the output of the text-to-speech function is also only "transitory" like a DVR buffer, then, consistent with the rule in Cartoon Network, no new work is created by Kindle's text-to-speech function, meaning it cannot be found to violate author's copyright.

The definition of what constitutes a derivative work is also not settled. The Ninth Circuit found in Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., that a copyright owner could essentially block any use or display of the copyrighted work (in that case, the transfer of a printed work onto tiles), the Seventh Circuit later found otherwise in Lee v. A.R.T. Co. in a highly similar set of facts. See Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d. 1341 (9th Cit. 1988), Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). While the Seventh Circuit opinion is the more widely accepted result, both precedents have been established.

If Kindle's text-to-speech function does not create a fixed digital recording it may also be relevant to consider whether using the feature to "read aloud" constitutes public performance, which is also controlled by copyright. To be a public performance, the act must to occur in- or be transmitted to a public place, which is anywhere there is a "substantial" number of people beyond one's own family and acquaintances. Hypothetically, Kindle's text-to-speech feature can be easily used for public performance within the meaning of the statute, though the intended purpose of the function is personal convenience—"In the middle of a great book or article but have to jump in the car? Simply turn on Text-to-Speech and listen on the go"—and as we learned from the Sony doctrine and its progeny, the mere fact that new technology has the ability to be used in an infringing manner is not enough to find liability for contributory infringement, provided there is a substantial non-infringing use.

Beyond the assertions of infringement and unlawful creation of a derivative work, one wonders if the Authors Guild's concerns stemmed primarily from the fear of lost audio book sales. Most audio books are read by professional voice-over artists or actors. The performance is a strong part of an audio book experience and allure, one that is not likely to be replaced by the computerized voice of Kindle 2.

In response to the Authors Guild, Amazon has agreed to allow authors to "opt out" of activating the feature on a case-by-case basis, while asserting without equivocation that it firmly believes the text-to-speech function is legal.

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Provisional Patent Applications—Disclosing Danger

Provisional patent applications have been available in some foreign countries, for example, in the UK, for many years. In an effort to harmonize US practice to the general WIPO practice and standards, a 1995 amendment to the US patent laws was implemented and provisional patent applications became available to US applicants. Since June 8, 1995, inventors have had the option of filing a provisional application under 35 U.S.C. §111(b). The purposes for this amendment to the law were two-fold. First, because the US Patent Office does not examine provisional applications, the filing fees are much lower than those of non-provisional applications ($220; $110 for small entities as of October 2008). In addition, provisional applications were meant to provide parity to US applicants, who under the old provisions were unable to "extend" the patent term beyond 20 years from the application's filing date. That is, in 1995, when the US patent laws were changed so the patent term became 20 years from the filing date, non-US applicants were granted an "extra" year in the US patent term as a result of the priority filing in their home country. To provide US applicants a similar benefit, the 12-month pendency for a provisional application is not counted toward the 20-year term of a patent which is granted on a subsequently filed non-provisional application claiming benefit of the filing date of the provisional application.

The trend shows an acceleration in provisional application filings. Over 130,000 applications have been filed in fiscal year 2007 ending on September 1, 2007, the last full year for which final statistics are available. Through the first five months of fiscal 2009 the pace of provisional application filings has been maintained, with conservative estimates being that about 11,000 provisional applications per month have been filed.

Some significant differences in provisional application requirements are that applications can be filed without claims to obtain a filing date and that the provisional applications are not examined and are not reviewed for substantive matters. The filing date of a provisional application is the date on which a written description of the invention, and drawings if necessary, are received by the USPTO. Since a provisional application expires after pending for a year, the applicant must file a non-provisional application to claim the benefit of the earlier provisional application filing date. If the applicant chooses to not file a US national application, but to file instead a PCT international application, the non-provisional, national phase application need not be filed in the USPTO until 2½ years after the PCT application filing date, which is the same due date as for the non-US filings.

The filing requirements for a provisional application are also not as strict as those for a non-provisional application, and this can mislead lay applicants into thinking that any type of documents or drawings can be filed to hold the date of invention. The general, and wrong, impression is that the provisional patent application filing system allows an applicant to obtain a valid priority filing date quickly and cheaply with minimal or no patent attorney involvement. Applicants have utilized the provisional application as a strategy to delay prosecution and avoid the filing fees and the time and application-preparation charges necessary for filing a non-provisional application.

The misunderstanding arises when a provisional application is filed with a bare-bones description that is not prepared in the normal manner, as it would be for a non-provisional application. The tactical advantage obtained in the provisional application filing is in the consideration that it is sufficient for providing protection to the applicant once the non-provisional application is filed. However, unless the disclosure of the provisional application is sufficient to enable the later filing of a non-provisional application, there is some danger that the provisional application priority date will not be granted to the non-provisional application and any intervening prior art may result in an impediment to obtaining a patent. There can be a crucial lapse if the applicant has previously made his invention public by a sale or publication in a research paper, since rights in foreign patents may be given up, and subject matter not disclosed in a provisional application will be treated as new matter in a subsequently filed non-provisional application.

Significantly, the practice of patent applicants who file a simple disclosure to obtain a provisional date—and then wait a year to provide a proper disclosure as part of the regular (non-provisional application) filing—has been found wanting by the courts. In New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found a patent was not accorded a priority filing date when the provisional application failed to enable the subsequently-filed disclosure.

However, for the non-provisional utility application to be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, the two applications must share at least one common inventor and the written description of the provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application:

‘An application for patent filed under section 111(a) or section 363 of this title for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in a provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title, by an inventor or inventors named in the provisional application, shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title, if the [regular non-provisional patent] application... is filed not later than 12 months after the date on which the provisional application was filed and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the provisional application.' 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1).

In other words, the specification of the provisional must ‘contain a written description of the invention and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms,' 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional application.

The practice by inventors of filing a provisional patent application with drawings and documents that may not fully enable the invention or the claims as ultimately issued, thinking that it will "cover" their invention, yields an unnecessary risk of having to defend patent-invalidity assertions based on insufficiency of the underlying provisional application that an accused infringer may raise. Inventors are advised to approach the filing and preparation of claims and drawings for a provisional application with this risk in mind.

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WHAT'S NEW IN PATENT LAW?Update on Recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Decisions

The year 2008 saw some significant decisions issued by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on patent law questions. In this article, we will highlight the key points of some of these decisions.

1. Patent Licensing and the Exhaustion Doctrine.

Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, a patent owner's patent rights in an article embodying a patent invention end once an authorized sale of the item occurs. In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. the Supreme Court considered how this doctrine applies in a licensing situation. Computer manufacturer Quanta purchased Intel chips and installed these chips in computers manufactured for others. LG owns several patents concerning these chips and licensed Intel to manufacture chips with the patented technology. LG did not license Intel's customers to install the chips in machines they were manufacturing for others. When LG sued Quanta for patent infringement, asserting that combination of the Intel chip and non-Intel components infringed LG's patents, Quanta argued that LG's patent rights were exhausted once Intel, as LG's licensee, made an authorized sale of the chips to Quanta. The Supreme Court agreed.

2. Patentability of Business Method Claims.

In In re Bilski the Federal Circuit addressed the question of the standard for review of proposed patent claims covering business methods. Business method claims are often utilized to protect a method of how a business performs an operation or procedure. Prior to Bilski, several different tests for patentability of these types of claims were being utilized by the Patent Office, such as the "machine or transformation" test, the "technological arts" test and the "useful, concrete, and tangible" test. Bilski clarified the issue by deciding that the "machine or transformation" test is the proper test. The "machine or transformation" test requires that a business method claim be tied to a particular machine (e.g., software code to be executed by a computer), or transform a tangible article. Without such ties, the claim is invalid.

3. Test for Infringement of Design Patents.

Prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., courts used two tests to determine infringement of a design patent. The first of these tests was the "ordinary observer" test, which requires a comparison between the accused design and the patented design, and then consideration of any applicable prior art designs. The second test was the "points of novelty" test, which focused on the points of novelty of the accused- and patented designs. Analysis under the points of novelty was often complicated if there were multiple points of novelty or if the point of novelty was a combination of design elements. Egyptian Goddess decided that ordinary observer test was the proper test for evaluating design patent infringement claims. This decision arguably increases the value of design patents by making claims of infringement less burdensome to support.

4. Opinion of Patent Counsel in Inducement-of-Infringement Claims.

An allegation of inducement-to-infringe requires that the patentee show that one has enabled another to infringe a patent and requires that the patentee establish that: (1) there has been direct infringement of the patent claims, and (2) the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement by another and possessed specific intent to encourage such infringement. In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of how opinions of counsel factor into inducement to infringe allegations.

Opinions of counsel in patent infringement claims are often obtained to provide a defense to a claim of willful infringement, which if shown could significantly increase monetary damages awarded to the patentee. A 2007 Federal Circuit decision appeared to pull back the importance and necessity of opinions of counsel in such claims, indicating that other evidence could be as probative on the issue. In Broadcom, however, the Federal Circuit held that a jury could consider evidence of whether an alleged infringer obtained an opinion of counsel in determining liability on an inducement-of-infringement claim, thus renewing the importance of these opinion letters in defending such a claim.

Qualcomm had not obtained opinions of counsel on the issue of patent infringement, but was not found liable on the willfulness count. Qualcomm unsuccessfully argued that it couldn't be found to have induced infringement if it wasn't liable for intentionally infringing, since the bar is higher to prove inducement. The Federal Circuit disagreed, instead finding that inducement can be found even without a showing of willfulness. The Court stated that because opinion-of-counsel evidence, along with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer "knew or should have known" that its actions would cause another to directly infringe, such evidence remains relevant to the second prong of the intent analysis in an inducement claim.

5. Direct Infringement of Method Claims.

A "method" claim in a patent includes a list of steps to perform the claimed invention. These types of claims can be written to require that the various steps be performed by different entities, which raises issues regarding proving an allegation for direct infringement of a method claim when there are multiple parties involved. In Muniaction v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed this issue by deciding that unless one of the parties exercises control over entire process, such an allegation could not be supported. The Court found that such control was not evident when the defendant auction company received data and determined the winning bidder, but did not control the actions taken by the bidders in submitting bid information.

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ICANN Releases Revised New gTLDs Applicant Guidebook for Public Comment

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) released a revised Draft Applicant Guidebook relating to its plans for the expansion of gTLDs (generic top-level domains). As previously reported in our October 2008 Newsletter, the guidebook provides a draft proposal for the application process and guidelines that will attach to any public or private organization that wants to register any string of letters as a gTLD. Upon receipt of public comments from many competing constituencies, such as trademark holders, registries, registrars, and domainers, ICANN has revised the policy documents and commenced a second Public Comment period through April 13, 2009. Potential applicants for new gTLDs should review the revised Draft Guidebook at ICANN's website at www.icann.org, but the guidebook is still a work in progress. ICANN has announced that the application process for new gTLDs likely will not occur before December 2009 at the earliest.

In the revisions, ICANN proposed a significant reduction in ongoing "Registry-Level Fees," reducing the original proposed $75,000 per year fee down to $25,000 per year. The revisions also pertained to a variety of issues including: the dispute resolution policy for objections to new gTLDs; the definitions of "Community-Based gTLDs" and "Open gTLDs," which pertain to gTLDs that may be open to the public or limited to a particular company or group; refund schedules for applications that have been withdrawn at various stages of the proceedings; and, changes to string contention procedures.

Of greater importance to trademark holders is what has not been fully addressed in the revisions. Based on the comments submitted by trademark holders and the international business community in the initial commenting period, ICANN has recognized that it needs to further evaluate "overarching issues" relating to trademark protection, security and stability, malicious conduct, demand and economic analysis. As a result, ICANN has not yet updated the policy regarding these issues, and is seeking further consultation, along with recommendations from the global business community, before updating the language in the policy regarding these issues.

Another issue that may greatly affect registrants, and in particular trademark holders, is the potential for tiered pricing, or lack of caps, for registration and renewal fees for domain names. If there are no price caps for the registries for new gTLDs, it is anticipated that the existing registries, such as for .COM, .ORG, .BIZ, etc., may request equal treatment. Tiered pricing would result in more popular or "elite" domains being charged varying prices, without any caps. This development potentially could result in current domain name holders being charged exorbitant renewal fees to maintain the domain names associated with their company name and trademarks. In the current economic climate, the lack of caps could significantly constrain a company's ability to properly budget and implement an effective offensive and defensive domain name strategy.

Although the Department of Justice has requested that ICANN further evaluate the need and public interest for new gTLDs, the proposed program appears to still be moving forward. ICANN is intending to meet with the intellectual property community in the coming weeks to address specific suggestions, along with responding to other competing constituencies, such as registries and registrars. Following the comment period ending on April 13, ICANN will issue a third draft of the Applicant Guidebook, anticipated in third quarter of 2009. However, now is the time for brand owners to take the opportunity to review the revisions to the Guidebook, and continue to provide ICANN with concerns, objections, and/or proposed solutions to the policies that may impact company's valuable trademark rights.

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Meet the New Law, Same as the Old Law

Much is written about how the Internet has changed the face of news reporting, information delivery and traditional print newspapers. There is also much written about new technologies requiring or creating new legal theories particular to them. Sometimes, though, seemingly archaic concepts apply to the fast-paced, need-to-know-now world of the internet.

The Associated Press ("AP") is a world-wide news-gathering and reporting organization. AP works with a global network of reporters who write and file news stories with it. AP in turn edits these items and provides the content to subscribers. Among AP subscribers are traditional print newspapers as well as internet-based and mobile news outlets. Many subscribers ultimately place AP content on their websites. AP subscriptions carry various terms and conditions and every story provided under the subscriptions contains copyright notices identifying AP as author and owner of the copyright.

All Headline News ("AHN") is a company whose employees were paid to scour the web to find breaking news stories from around the world and prepare them for republication under the AHN name. This was done by either re-writing the stories or simply copying them in full. Often, AHN employees simply removed an original author's copyright claim from a story, paraphrased the story and republished it. Sometimes, AHN attributed content to the original author in its reworked stories, but often not. Many of AHN's stories were simply paraphrased AP items. AHN, like AP, would provide its news stories to subscribers who would then publish the items.

AP filed suit alleging, among other things, that a ninety-year-old little-utilized legal theory provided it with a cause of action against AHN for "misappropriation of hot news." This cause of action has its basis in a 1918 U.S. Supreme Court decision also involving AP and at a time when competition among newspapers and reporting organizations was both intensely fierce and fueled by new technology—the telephone and radio wire. In that case, William Randolph Hearst's International News Service ("INS") actually bribed AP reporters and newspapers that subscribed to the AP wire (when it was a wire) to provide AP's breaking news stories to INS before publishing them. Hearst's INS would then rewrite those stories as its own and send them off to its wire subscribers, thus "getting the scoop" on AP.

Copyright law does not necessarily apply to the news itself, since the underlying facts or events giving rise to a news-worthy item cannot be property rights in and of themselves. Only the expression or interpretation of news-worthy events can be protected. This would seem to leave "news" unprotectable. The Supreme Court, however, recognized there is a "quasi-property right" in the reporting of "hot news." Time and expense is involved in newsgathering and reporting and when those efforts yield items of immediate interest—breaking news—the party who put forth the work to develop the news and "break" a story should have the primary right to enjoy the results of same, including profiting from selling its story. INS's practice of seeking diversion of AP news and rewriting it for its own wire was an attempt to "reap what it has not sown." Thus, the Supreme Court held there is a cause of action against a party who misappropriates "hot news."

Though the elements and parameters of this claim were developed almost a century ago, it is little-used and not widely accepted in American jurisprudence. In fact, the only state that allows such a cause of action is New York, which is where AP brought its suit against AHN. AHN tried to dismiss AP's misappropriation of hot news claims, in part by arguing that Florida-, not New York law applied. Nevertheless, just a few weeks ago the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found the ninety-year-old cause of action still available to AP based on the facts alleged in its complaint.

This is not a copyright doctrine, but rather a form of unfair competition. Still, the 1918 decision and cause of action it created was an application of legal concepts to a highly-competitive news industry growing with the use of new technologies. Sometimes, even the latest technologies can be governed by the "old" rules.

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Multiple-Class Registrations and Fraud: New TTAB Precedent

On January 29, 2009, the USPTO Trademark Trial and Appeal Board further clarified the fraud doctrine, holding that fraud committed as to one class in a multiple-class registration requires cancellation only as to that class, and not as to all classes of the registration.

G&W Laboratories, Inc. ("Labs") filed a section 2(d) opposition against G W Pharma Limited's ("Pharma") application for GW PHARMACEUTICALS & Design on the grounds of priority and likelihood of confusion, relying on two registrations, one for G&W in Classes 5 and 35 and the other for G&W & Design in Classes 5 and 35. Pharma thereafter filed counterclaims for cancellation of Labs' registrations in their entireties on the grounds of fraud, alleging that Labs never used either mark in connection with the services in Class 35.

After the counterclaims were filed, Labs proceeded to make its required filings under Section 8 for each registration requesting deletion of the Class 35 services in each registration, and thereafter filed motions to dismiss the counterclaims against Class 35 as moot and the counterclaims against Class 5 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pharma argued, however, that deletion of a class of goods or services procured through fraud during maintenance of the registration does not cure fraud, and that if fraud is proved as to Labs' registrations in Class 35, each registration must be cancelled in its entirety, relying on Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx Inc., 67 USPQ2d 1205, 1208 (TTAB 2003):

[D]eletion of the goods upon which the mark has not yet been used does not remedy an alleged fraud upon the Office. If fraud can be shown in the procurement of a registration, the entire resulting registration is void.

While Labs admitted that it never used its marks on the Class 35 services, it argued that a claim of fraud directed towards one class of a multiple-class registration cannot render the entire registration void.

The Board denied Labs' motion to dismiss the Class 35 counterclaims, agreeing with Pharma that deletion of services through a Section 8 filing cannot cure fraud. The Board noted that a registrant's request to delete a class subject to a cancellation proceeding in a Section 8 affidavit is governed by Trademark Rule 2.134(a), which provides that a request for such deletion by a respondent in a cancellation proceeding without written consent from every adverse party to the proceeding results in judgment against the respondent. Because no written consent to the deletion of the Class 35 goods was sought or obtained from Pharma, judgment was entered against Labs.

The motions to dismiss the counterclaims as to Class 5, however, were granted. The Board pointed out that all of the cases finding fraud since Medinol involved invalidation of single-class applications or registrations, holding that "fraud as to any goods or services in a single class will lead to a finding that the application or registration is void in the class in which the fraud has been committed", but noted that they had not yet considered fraud in less than all the classes of a multiple-class registration. The Board likened multiple-class applications to a series of single-class applications because they still require a filing fee, date of use, and specimen for each class involved, and because the filer of a multiple-class application is essentially in no different position that if it filed several single-class applications. The Board therefore held that "each class of goods or services in a multiple-class registration must be considered separately when reviewing the issue of fraud, and judgment on the ground of fraud as to one class does not in itself require cancellation of all classes in a registration." The Board reasoned that any other holding would essentially provide an incentive to file single-class versus multiple-class applications.

The decision further clarifies the proper application of the fraud doctrine. While trademark owners must remain diligent in ensuring all information in an application is correct, it is now clear that they do not face a threat of losing trademark rights in an entire multiple-class registration based on errors in a single class.

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